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INTRODUCTION
Innovation projects are skyrocketing in China. By 2020, selfdriven innovation (zizhu chuangxin) might take China to a global
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innovation peak.1 Yet, the concept of zizhu chuangxin, or what I call
self-driven innovation, is still quite new to the wider international
community. During 2009–10, when I conducted several studies on
China’s national innovation strategies and policy incentives from a
holistic perspective, it was difficult to find any literature on this topic in
English legal scholarship.2 A few works were available, in both English
and Chinese, in the fields of economics, art, and politics. But they did
not employ a holistic perspective, which is essential to facilitate a
proper understanding of the contexts, purposes, and tendencies of
China’s innovation progress.3 Nor did these works attract, as Peter Yu
recently described, “the narrative about piracy” in China.4 In light of the
absence of scholarship on the topic, and given the recent rise of China
as a technological power, it is not surprising that since 2010 many more
publications—surfing the waves of China’s high-tech and creative
industries—have issued. Yet concurrent with China’s development,
foreign concerns over China grow and a holistic perspective in the
scholarship on China remains scarce.5
As a result, it is important to re-emphasize and further develop a
holistic perspective on Chinese innovation. This Article seeks to expand
that perspective and, especially, to make it more understandable for
researchers who are unfamiliar with Chinese culture and history. Of
1 One of the key indicators is that China’s innovative potential is ranked among the top ten.
In particular, China’s innovative efficiency in terms of the growths of human resources, R&D
input by companies, and financial support by government are ranked respectively top four, two,
and four. Hua Yedi, China’s Weak Innovative Capacity and Leading Innovation Potentials,
XINHUA NEWS, Feb. 3, 2010.
2 See Ken Shao, Patent Law, National Strategies and Policy Incentives: China’s Road to a
Leading Innovator, 14 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 85 (2011) [hereinafter Shao, Patent Law,
National Strategies and Policy Incentives]. A book published in 2006 by economists devoted one
paragraph to China’s history of technology, but in the conventional and negative way. See
SHULIN GU & MARK DODGSON, INNOVATION IN CHINA: HARMONIOUS TRANSFORMATION? 11
(2006). A holistic perspective aims at clarifying China’s motivation and directions in its
innovation policies and thus at least needs to include a combined perspective of cultural,
historical and international analysis. One notable exception used various statistics to analyze the
relationship between Chinese patent law and innovation. However, it did not scrutinize what the
imbalanced global intellectual property regime means to China’s innovation. See Linda Yueh,
Patent Laws and Innovation in China, 29 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 304 (2009). Recently, I further
expanded my holistic perspective to include a broader historical perspective. See Ken Shao,
History is a Key Decoder: Why China Aims at Re-emerging as a Global Leader of Innovation,
LAW IN CONTEXT (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Shao, History is a Key Decoder].
3 One excellent exception in regard to a holistic perspective of history is an introductory
portrait of China’s continuity and change in culture-knowledge economy from pre-history to
modern China, possibly because China’s history of culture is more known than that of
technology. See MICHAEL KEANE, CREATED IN CHINA: THE GREAT NEW LEAP FORWARD
(2007).
4 Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 525, 527 (2012).
5 One notable exception is a 2012 book containing insightful discussions of China’s creative
industries and copyright. See LAIKWAN PANG, CREATIVITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: CHINA’S
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OFFENSES (2012).
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course, the relevant topics of Chinese culture and history are extremely
complex and lengthy, and thus impossible to fully cover in a single
article. Yet, a basic framework can go a long way to guide the readers
towards a holistic understanding of China’s innovation progress and its
relation to IP.
Before we begin to present a holistic perspective, it is important to
define self-driven innovation (zizhu chuangxin). The English term
innovation does not have a universally-accepted definition.6 In general,
innovation refers to technological advancements in products and
processes.7 While the term self-driven innovation in its Chinese context,
too, refers to new inventions in certain industrial and technological
areas,8 it attracts no interpretive difficulty to extend it to cover cultural
and creative industries as well. Chuangxin means creating newness, and
this may include knowledge creativity as a whole.9 For the benefit of
simplicity, such a broad definition of innovation is used in this Article.
An even more confusing term is zizhu itself, which captures the
senses of “original,” “independent,” and “ownership.”10 Often the term
zizhu is translated as “indigenous” 11 and is confused—in ideological,
non-holistic stereotypes—with “self-reliance” (zili gengsheng), a Maoist
policy. 12 There is also a rarely-adopted translation: “sovereign
innovation”. 13 The term sovereign is highly insightful, but, when it
6 PHILIPP HERZOG, OPEN AND CLOSED INNOVATION: DIFFERENT CULTURES FOR
DIFFERENT STRATEGIES 9 (2d ed. 2011).
7 OECD, OSLO MANUAL: THE MEASUREMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ACTIVITIES, PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION DATA 28 (2d ed. 1997).
8 Self-driven innovation is normally defined to include subject matters such as computers
and their applications, telecommunication products, software, modern office appliances, newenergy equipment, energy-efficient products, and so on. For instance, see The Notice of Starting
National Self-Driven Innovation Accreditation (Consultation Paper) 2010, MINISTRY OF SCI. &
TECH. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Apr. 9, 2010), available at
www.most.gov.cn/tztg/201004/t20100409_76710.htm.
9 In fact, as Michael Keane notes, creativity joined innovation in government discourse in
China in 2006. MICHAEL KEANE, CHINA’S NEW CREATIVE CLUSTERS: GOVERNANCE, HUMAN
CAPITAL AND INVESTMENT 1 (2011) [hereinafter KEANE, CHINA’S NEW CREATIVE CLUSTERS].
10 Tian Lipu has defined zizhu as “belonging to oneself, human created and new.” SIPO
Director Tian Lipu on the Important Role of Patent System, THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(Jan.
9,
2006),
http://www.gov.cn/zwhd/2006-01/09/content_151769.htm.
11 “Indigenous” is the official term used by the U.S. government. For instance, see U.S. INT’L
TRADE COMM’N, INV. NO. 332-519, USITC PUB. 4226, CHINA: EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 5-5–
5-9 (2011) [hereinafter ITC 2011 REPORT].
12 Mao Zedong’s self-reliance policy was a left-wing overarching policy framework that
isolated China from the capitalist world. It is widely believed that Deng Xiaoping’s reformist
change was a reaction to this policy. For a comprehensive study, see Fredrich W. Wu, Socialist
Development of Self-Reliance Within the Capitalist World Economy: The Chinese View in the
Post-Mao Era, in THE END OF AN ISOLATION: CHINA AFTER MAO 234–36 (Harish Kapur ed.,
1985).
13 Will China Protect Intellectual Property? New Developments in Counterfeiting, Piracy,
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comes to the current Sino-West relations, is also somewhat politically
overdosed. It is insightful because the global IP regime is being eroded
by private interest of big companies through various channels and the
principle of sovereignty is much needed in IP governance by all national
governments, especially those in developing countries, to combat the
threat of global private interests. 14 Without domestic innovation, a
country may lose long-term development competitiveness in this global
IP regime. 15 For this reason, zizhu chuangxin in China does have a
sovereignty agenda: domestic innovation is essential to any country’s
ongoing success, and China is no exception.
However, the term zizhu is arguably more concerned with
commercialization and development, than simply with sovereignty. The
argument that the modern Chinese economy must shift from laborintensive to knowledge-based is now being widely debated in China.
And this economic transition has become a central government policy in
which innovation plays a crucial role.16 As such, this Article proposes
using the term self-driven (zizhu) to encompass all of the innovationrelated sovereignty issues, competitiveness, and development agendas
of a nation. Sometimes, I may simply use innovation without adding
self-driven when the term is self-explanatory in the context.
To present a holistic view approachable by both Western and
and Forced Technology Transfer: Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec. Commission on China, 111th
Cong. 40–41 (2010) (statement of Richard P. Suttmeier) [hereinafter Statement of Richard P.
Suttmeier].
14 For an unprecedented and first-hand study of the global private governance of intellectual
property, see PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES
AND THEIR CLIENTS (2010) [hereinafter DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE].
Administering a patent system is one of the few areas of intellectual property over
which developing countries have considerable sovereign discretion. Patent offices
might be one place in which one might find developing-country resistance to the
hegemony that the US, EU and Japan exercise over patent standard-setting processes.
Instead, I found that developing-country patent offices were being deeply integrated
into a system of patent office administration that was being led by the patent offices of
the US, EU, and Japan. So while developing-country negotiators would contest the
standard-setting games of the US, EU, and Japan in places like the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual Property Organization, their patent
offices were closely and quietly cooperating with the patent offices of these three
countries.
Id. at xiv.
15 As Yale University Professor Jack Balkin pointed out, “because not all countries
participate in the global economy equally, not all of their citizens enjoy its benefits equally.” Jack
Balkin, What is Access to Knowledge?, Presentation at the Yale Information Society Project
Access
to
Knowledge
Conference
(Apr.
21,
2006),
available
at
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/04/what-is-access-to-knowledge.html.
16 This is clearly reflected in the National Medium and Long-Term Guideline for Science
and Technology Development Plan 2006–2020, which is one of the most important policies for
China’s self-driven innovation. As it states, “by 2020, the progress of science and technology will
contribute 60 percent or above to the country’s development.” For further details, see China
Issues Guidelines on Sci-Tech Development Program, CHINA.GOV.CN (Feb. 9, 2006),
http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-02/09/content_184426.htm.
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Chinese audience, this Article will first discuss the forces operating
against a holistic view of China and explain exactly what it means to
employ a holistic view. Then, by emphasizing the historical,
international, and developmental contexts, the Article aims to introduce
the reader to real examples of a holistic perspective, and in turn, to reframe the discourse around China’s self-driven innovation.
I. A HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE
A. The Framework Behind a Holistic Approach
A holistic perspective of China’s IP and innovation strategies and
developments is not simply a stylistic approach. Rather, it is a necessary
approach to analyzing IP and innovation in China. There is a long way
to go in order to have a proper understanding of the Chinese context and
history that informs these issues—and such conversations to get those in
the West, and, in fact, widely within China, in line with a holistic
perspective need to be steadily engaged at various levels.
Understandably, for the wider Western world, the possibility of an
innovative China may appear to be a sudden shift in international
innovative power, and possibly, another earthshaking blow to hit the
West amid China’s massive outbound investment in the Global
Financial Crisis Era. 17 This fear of China’s growth is only worsened
when an ideological non-holistic mindset flashes by, linking the term
zizhu (self-driven) to the Maoist term zili gengsheng (self-reliance).18
Thus, it is not surprising that Western critics have used the term
“techno-nationalism” to describe the nature of China’s current efforts in
self-driven innovation. 19 For many, “self-reliant” or “indigenous”
innovation is at odds with globalization and sings a left-wing or
nationalist ringtone. Here vigilance over things like military
technologies, cyber security, and tech-spying inevitably proliferate.20 In
fact, keywords such as threats, unequal treatment, government
procurement, subsidies, preferential lending, Chinese technical
standards, and patent infringement appear frequently in the U.S.

17 China’s outbound investment has been a major global phenomenon since 2008. This is
particularly true in Australia and Africa. For a recent report, see China’s Outbound Investment
Leaps to Record High in December, CNBC (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100389317.
18 For an interesting and “semi-holistic” perspective, see David Kerr, Has China Abandoned
Self-Reliance?, 14 REV. OF INT’L POL. ECON. 77 (2007).
19 Richard Wallace, China Eyes ‘Creative’ Industries in IP Push, ELEC. ENG’G TIMES, Aug.
29, 2005, at 1.
20 For an interesting book along these lines, see ADAM SEGAL, ADVANTAGE: HOW
AMERICAN INNOVATION CAN OVERCOME THE ASIAN CHALLENGE (2011). Recently, such fear
led to the Australian government’s ban on China Huawei’s bid in the AU$38 billion Australian
National Broadband Network. For a report on the event, see Geoffrey Barker & David Ramli,
China Giant Banned from NBN, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Mar. 26, 2012, at 1.
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government’s official reports on innovation in China.21
The use of these keywords reflects Western reactions to the re-rise
of China as an innovation force. These reactions are very
understandable, but are rooted in a dualistic, disconnected, and quite
messy world view. Excessive talk on China’s piracy and weak
enforcement of foreign IP rights dominates the Western conversation on
China, yet this heavy emphasis is insular. The focus on these issues
ignores the international context under which the world’s knowledge
economy favors the interest of big players and overlooks the
development agendas and autonomy of developing countries.22 On the
other hand, specific focuses on the grand policies and economic scales
of China’s self-driven innovation without a holistic perspective can
easily lead many to a psychological fear of the “yellow peril,” or what
Samuel Huntington doomed, “the clash of civilizations.”23
The term holistic may include everything that is relevant. 24
However, in the discourse of China affairs, I particularly equate holistic
to what I often call the “true China knowledge.” 25 By true China
knowledge I mean an informed perspective on Chinese events that is
rooted in a deep and holistic understanding of the country’s culture and
history. Overall, true China knowledge remains extremely poor in
Western countries, as well as in China. For instance, is guanxi a Chinese
value? 26 Did China have no understanding of rule of law in its own
tradition? Where is China’s current transition heading to? The scarcity
of true China knowledge in part accounts for many missteps of bilateral,
cultural and economic policies—with Australia’s resource industry as a
classic and most recent example.27
21 See, e.g., ITC 2011 REPORT, supra note 11. These terms also appear in Congressional
hearings on China. See China’s Indigenous Innovation Trade and Investment Policies: How
Great a Threat?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the
H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 69–70 (2011) (statement of Thea Mei Lee, Deputy
Chief of Staff, Am. Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. Orgs.).
22 For further details, see DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
23 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER (1996). “In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the
politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.”
Id. at 28.
24 A holistic perspective is not limited to China’s innovation economy, law, and policies. I
have applied this perspective to various trans-disciplinary matters. Innovation, however,
represents a key agenda of China’s economic future and thus is an area that urgently requires a
holistic perspective.
25 I use this invented term when discussing China-related issues. For further discussion, see
Ken Shao, The True China Knowledge that Australian Businessmen Should Know, CHINAAUSTL. ENTREPRENEURS, Sept. 2010, at 26–29 [hereinafter Shao, True China Knowledge].
26 “Guanxi” is a quite unique business culture in today’s China and can be broadly defined as
drawing on connections in order to secure favors in personal relations. For further studies, see
Yadong Luo, GUANXI AND BUSINESS 2 (2000).
27 The Australian business communities have also unanimously agreed that their own
understanding of China is slim. This has been confirmed by the dialogue I have witnessed first-
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B. Identifying Non-Holistic Reasoning and Defining a Holistic
Approach to China
The typical non-holistic reasoning works in a two-step process.
First, its short-sighted lens searches the normalcy of China only from
the framework of a nineteenth-century China under the challenge of the
then-rising Western Powers, the Chinese “low-end” tradition that feeds
the West with distorted China images,28 or transitional China’s ongoing
perplexing dilemmas. 29 Second, it satisfies itself in this illusive
normalcy and ignores other facts, believing that China is just like the
distortive images present it to be and has always been that way. Max
Weber (1864-1920)’s work perfectly reflects this two-step reasoning.
Without any direct contact with China, he made up a normalcy by
relying on several travellers’ descriptions of China’s low-end culture in
the late nineteenth century. 30 Weber, of course, had little idea that
capitalism had in fact existed earlier in China.31
Reasoning in the modern discourses around IP piracy in China
follows exactly the same two-step, non-holistic process: first, people are
only familiar with contemporary China’s rampant piracy industry;
second, by looking at contemporary China’s rampant piracy industry,
people believe that piracy has always been this way in China’s history.
This reasoning process gravely misunderstands Chinese cultural and
legal history. The consequence is inevitably a cumulated selfreassurance, which claims that China’s numerous problems today are so
deeply rooted in its own history and culture that they may create big
threats to the world, especially when China’s post-1949 institutions
hand in numerous business seminars that I have attended.
28 China’s high-end tradition, which is really the source for understanding the Chinese
culture, remains largely unfamiliar to the Westerners. The difference between low-end and highend traditions was originally proposed by Xu Fuguan, one of the leaders of the second generation
of Neo-Confucian studies. See Xu Fuguan, On Tradition, in SELECTED ESSAYS OF XU FUGUAN
99–110 (1980). In Xu’s dichotomy, the high-end tradition refers to cultural and intellectual
tradition among the intellectuals while the low-end tradition belongs to what normal people apply
without self-consciousness. What Xu tried to explain is probably the phenomenon that many
elegant, rational, and highly developed traditions have been lost, distorted, or wrongly practiced
in late imperial China.
29 This can also be called the culture-explanation perspective. See Ken Shao, The Global
Debates on Intellectual Property: What if China is not a Born Pirate?, 2010 INTELL. PROP. Q.
341, 349–351 [hereinafter Shao, The Global Debates on Intellectual Property].
30 Two famous books of Max Weber are relevant: MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC
AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., 1962); MAX WEBER, THE RELIGION OF
CHINA: CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM (Hans H. Gerth trans. & ed., 1968).
31 For instance, there are studies on capitalism in sixteenth and seventeenth century China
during the late Ming Dynasty. MING QING ZIBEN ZHUYI MENGYA YANJIU LUNWEN JI [ESSAY
COLLECTIONS OF THE STUDIES ON EMBRYONIC CAPITALISM OF THE MING AND QING] (Institute
of Ming and Qing History of Nanjing University ed., 1981). Whether the term “embryonic” is
contestable, as the book was written during China’s left-wing period.
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have remained heterogeneous with the Western model.
The above phenomena have complex external and internal
inducements. In addition to myopia in the post-Cold War aftershock,
racism might be another one. A pioneer book, Fu Manchu and the
Yellow Peril, demonstrates that the confounded and long-entrenched
ideology against the Chinese had been hideous, for many decades, in
thousands of English works of fiction. 32 Although blatant racism has
since been dispelled, its impact remains. Older Western generations
were immersed in Fu Manchu audiovisuals, just as their Chinese peers
were dyed in the red ocean of the Cultural Revolution. These early
memories do fertilize adult mentalities. A rising China, or a re-rising
China, might create a subtle feeling of tension within Westerners, if
China is only perceived in disconnection, fragmentation, and
ideology—a perspective this is locked in the past and shaped by
imagery.
But racism and political myopia are not the ultimate causes of the
lack of the holistic perspective of China. The rise of the modern West
has underpinned—in a psychologically inevitable way—a sense of
Eurocentric superiority, which tends to ignore and marginalize other
cultures. Racist and political stereotypes are consequences of this
Eurocentric feeling of superiority, not the cause. Nor indeed is
superiority itself the cause.33 As early as the seventeenth century, China
had failed to do well to impress the Western world. The Fu Manchu
images do sketch some features of the Manchu Qing Period (16441912), which culturally and institutionally disconnected itself from the
authentic Chinese civilization that was far more developed but
continues to have much to be appreciated by modernity.34 Creativity and
technologies in the Qing Period were also far less advanced than its
predecessor periods. The Qing Period was a crucial turning point during
which China drastically declined and Europe, Japan, and some other
Asian countries changed from Sinophilie (praising China) to Sinophobie
(despising China). 35 This historical downside is one of the ultimate
causes of the scarcity of true China knowledge.
Further entrenching the disconnect, post-Manchu revolutions,
including Dr. Sun Yet-sen’s, did not really focus on re-connecting

32 JENNY CLEGG, FU MANCHU AND THE YELLOW PERIL: THE MAKING OF A RACIST MYTH
(1994).
33 The phenomenon of Western superiority as a natural process is uniquely analyzed in Ken
Shao, The Two Londons That I Love, CHINESE SCHOLARS, Nov. 2008, at 28–29.
34 The Qing might have fundamentally changed China’s political system into an extreme
form of despotism. See QIAN MU, THE GAIN AND LOSS OF CHINESE POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN
HISTORY (2001).
35 For a landmark work on the disconnection caused by Manchu’s abandonment of some
fundamental elements of Chinese culture, see Ge Zhaoguang, Drifting Away: the Disconnection
between Mid-Qing China and Japan and Korea, 9 SHU CHENG 46–50 (2004).
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China to its authenticity. 36 The Chinese intellectual and political
communities either rejected or insisted on the forms of Chinese culture
readily around them, without realizing that their subject matters were
often relevant mainly to the Qing legacies.37 For instance, much of the
orthodox Confucianism under attack was only exemplified during the
Qing Period whilst Confucianism as a whole was the receiver of
criticisms.38
When the Qing comet left, its long tail continued to cover the
Chinese, including their China towns—the initial target of Fu Manchu
fictions—and to direct China away from re-connecting with its
authentic culture and heritage. In Mainland China, this situation was
further worsened when Mao’s extreme Leftist campaigns devoted
themselves to annihilating Chinese culture. These negative legacies
among Mainland China and overseas have resulted in contemporary
Chinese misconception of their own culture, which is subsequently
transmitted to foreigners through globalization. 39 The scarcity of true
China knowledge is fundamentally related to this complex modern
history of China.
Whatever the causes are, the practical solution depends on whether
we are willing to accept hard facts. This may be difficult as the inertia
of Eurocentrism can be long-lasting. As Karen Turner noted, despite the
availability of many new historical findings since Max Weber’s
nineteenth-century misconstruction of China, many Sinologists have
continued to remain intoxicated with a Weberian mentality. 40 It is
indeed an intellectual and psychological challenge for many people,
including the Chinese, to develop a holistic perspective of China when
Chinese images are full of interwoven misconceptions and transitional
36 Interestingly, the first of three underlining political principles of Dr. Sun Yet-sen’s
republican revolution was nationalism, which aimed at expelling the northern barbarians
(Manchu). However, Dr. Sun’s revolution did not lead to necessary cultural revival. As a
consequence, the radical New Culture Movement influenced by American liberalism and Russian
communism soon spread across China, just a few years after the collapse of Manchu Qing in
1911. The New Culture Movement was successful in criticizing the so-called Chinese culture and
tradition, which, in fact, largely belonged to the low-end tradition Xu Fuguan described. See Xu
Fuguan, On Tradition, in SELECTED ESSAYS OF XU FUGUAN 99–110 (1980). The low-end
tradition, as argued by this paper, can largely be founded in Qing Dynasty’s version of Chinese
culture and certainly cannot represent the more advanced Chinese culture that had existed. For an
insightful book about the New Culture Movement, see TSE-TSUNG CHOW, THE MAY FOURTH
MOVEMENT: INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION IN MODERN CHINA (1960).
37 Some leaders of the second generation of Neo-Confucianism, however, made some
philosophical, not institutional, efforts to reconnect. For a discussion, see YINGSHI YU,
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFUCIAN CULTURE (2000).
38 Ping-ti Ho, The Significance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History, 26 J. ASIAN STUD.
189, 192 (1967).
39 The funny understanding of Chinese culture among Australian resource industries is a good
example.
40 KAREN TURNER & GAO HONG-JUN, AMERICAN SCHOLARS ON CHINESE LEGAL
TRADITION 16 (He Wei-fang ed., 1994).

SHAO, FINAL (Do Not Delete)

2013

4/25/2013 11:13 PM

CALLING FOR A HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE

177

dilemmas in complicated domestic and international contexts.
II. NEVER IGNORE THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A holistic perspective of China’s self-driven innovation needs to
start with a proper understanding of history. Holding our historical
treasure map, we will not stop at the Cold War or the China-West
conflicts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Rather, our precise
destination is where China’s self-driven innovation and Chinese highend cultural DNA converge. Here is where my holistic perspective of
China’s history of innovation, creativity, and IP—which is widely
ignored in Western, and even Chinese, communities—is located.41
The Chinese are often described as copycats. This conventional
impression, at least in Western IP sectors, is derived from William
Alford who argued that “the power of past” is overwhelming in Chinese
history.42 This theory of the past led Alford to claim that “the replication
of particular concrete manifestations . . . by persons other than those
who first gave them form never carried . . . the dark
connotations . . . [as] it does in the West.”43 It must be pointed out that
Alford did not reject the existence of innovation and creativity in
Chinese history.44 However, in his thesis, this point is too faint to attract
any attention of both Western and Chinese readers who have no
substantial knowledge of Chinese culture.
A matter with immediate relevance to the above is the state of IP in
China. Contemporary China’s controversial record in infringing foreign
IP rights naturally leads Western countries to believe that the Chinese
are really copycats by their cultural DNA and most definitely have
never developed any indigenous notion of IP. Political control, as
Alford argued, had been the central agenda in traditional China, making
a policy of strong IP rights impossible to indigenously grow. 45
Embracing this view, Western scholars widely believe that Chinese
aesthetic preference for imitation is difficult to reconcile with
international IP standards.46 These extremely fancy expressions reflect a
41 See e.g., Shao, The Global Debates on Intellectual Property, supra note 29; Ken Shao,
Ingeniousness Excelling Nature: Inventors, Incentives and Technology Distribution Mechanism
in Traditional China (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Shao, Ingeniousness Excelling Nature];
Ken Shao, Alien to Copyright?: A Reconsideration of the Chinese Historical Episodes of
Copyright, 2005 INTELL. PROP. Q. 400 [hereinafter Shao, Alien to Copyright?].
42 For his detailed discussion, see WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT
OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 19–29 (1995).
43 Id. at 28.
44 Id. at 22.
45 Id. at 16–17.
46 The following wording is very typical: “The Chinese esthetic preference for imitation is
difficult to reconcile with the Berne Convention’s prohibition of illegitimate reproduction and
respect for innovation.” Susan Tiefenbrun, A Hermeneutic Methodology and How Pirates Read
and Misread the Berne Convention, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 21, 22 (1999).
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popular, disconnected, and messy impression of China in Western
communities.
Unfortunately, without rich and vivid pictures of China’s history
and culture of innovation, creativity, and IP, the materials available to a
skeptical Western mind for weaving a self-convincing Chinese picture
are no more than political regime, copycat behaviors, infringement
activities, flea market sales, burned pirated DVDs, and technonationalist policies. 47 By comparison, when discussing the creative
achievements of the West, grand filmic scenes such as the Renaissance,
the Statute of Anne, the Industrial Revolution, or Thomas Edison’s light
bulb quietly linger around the conversation. We have to admit that, as
the post-structuralist Edward Said stated, no production of knowledge in
the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim the author’s
involvement as a human subject in his own circumstance.48
The “image theory” employed above is psychologically true and is
one of the methodologies I created to support my research in Chinarelated issues.49 It emphasizes the importance of micro-historicity and
interdisciplinary approaches. For instance, in attempting to understand
China’s copyright history, it is too obscure to crassly cast China as a
loyalist to imperial power. Micro-level details such as the size of
Chinese publishing industry, the scale of free trade, the context of
rational political control measures, and Chinese authors’ attitudes
towards creativity and copyright must be examined. One question, for
example, is why the sixteenth-century Chinese publishers with business
sizes larger than those of their counterparts in London had developed
copyright practice that did not contain the monopolistic nature of the
London copyright claimers?50 Such examination can only happen in an
interdisciplinary manner, requiring, in the first place, a thorough
investigation into Chinese histories of philosophy, art, poetry,
commerce, and technology.51
To put it a simple way, IP practices emerged in traditional China in
tune with the nation’s economic, technological, and cultural progresses.
In fact, when the U.S. attempted to push China to join the Paris
47 In a very different ideological niche, Chinese scholars often refer to other keywords that
are heavily influenced by the left-wing ideology of the radical New Culture Movement in China
in the 1910s. See, e.g., Liwei Wang, The Chinese Traditions Inimical to the Patent Law, 14 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 15 (1993).
48 For Said’s post-structuralist view, see EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978).
49 A similar methodology was developed in psychology but for analyzing the role of images
in decision making. See Lee Roy Beach, Broadening the Definition of Decision Making: The Role
of Prechoice Screening of Options, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 215 (1993).
50 For a detailed discussion of the fundamental differences in Chinese and British copyright
monopoly, see Ken Shao, The Promotion of Learning in Chinese History: to Discover the Lost
Soul of Modern Copyright, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 63 (2010) [hereinafter Shao, The Promotion of
Learning in Chinese History].
51 For a succinct analysis, see Shao, supra note 29, at 352–54.

SHAO, FINAL (Do Not Delete)

2013

CALLING FOR A HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE

4/25/2013 11:13 PM

179

Convention in the late nineteenth century, the Chinese officials and
scholars who resisted were not at odds with copyright law in itself, but
believed that China needed flexibility in its copyright policy in order to
continue importing foreign books 52 —a “developing-country agenda”
that was heavily used by the U.S. itself in the 1840s and can easily
stimulate the release of compassion hormones among many IP scholars
today.
With regard to innovation and creativity, it needs to be reiterated
that a fundamental nature of Chinese philosophy is creativity—the
ultimate driving force of the universe. Landmark Chinese philosophers,
authors, and poets were often faultfinders of creative power, claiming
the necessity of creating new ideas that had never been thought of by
any predecessors.53 Readers should not associate these Chinese views
on creativity with a conventional belief that the Chinese favor
“collaborative production,” 54 a term relating to collective work or
ownership. Rather, the concept of “individual” author or creator clearly
existed in traditional China, often without conflict with scholarly
collaboration and knowledge sharing. 55 Inventors were regarded as
sages and governmental efforts in promoting innovation and technology
distribution were impressive.56 The Chinese classic understanding of the
incredible intelligence of inventors is strikingly similar to a famous
saying of the renowned nineteenth century German composer, Robert
A. Schumann: “talent works, genius creates.”57 What then can explain
why China had remained a world economic leader for centuries? The
simple answer is that sought-after Chinese exports in the global market
were not simply “made in China,” but “designed in China.” Even a
specific color on a piece of porcelain meant cutting-edge technology
that other countries had obvious difficulties to duplicate.58
Yet, the Chinese talent in innovation had subsequently been lost
for centuries due to internal and external factors that are too complex to
52 For various historical texts, see ZHOU LIN & LI MING-SHAN, HISTORICAL MATERIALS FOR
THE STUDIES OF CHINA’S COPYRIGHT HISTORY 133–259 (1999).
53 For a detailed analysis of the Chinese thinking of creativity, see Shao, Alien to Copyright?,

supra note 41, at 412–19.
54 After discussing the so-called Confucian concepts of creativity, Montgomery and
Fitzgerald wrote “[t]he key issue is: Will China’s historical acceptance of collaborative
production…survive in the light of changes to the PRC’s copyright regime prompted by the
TRIPs agreement?” Lucy Montgomery & Brian Fitzgerald, Copyright and the creative industries
in China, 9 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL STUD. 407, 409 (2006). This is yet again another common
example of how researchers misunderstand China’s history and culture of creativity.
55 For the non-monopolistic nature of China’s copyright and knowledge creativity, see Shao,
The Promotion of Learning in Chinese History, supra note 50, at 81–85.
56 Shao, Ingeniousness Excelling Nature, supra note 41.
57 HANS EYSENCK, GENIUS: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF CREATIVITY 11 (1995) (quoting
Robert A. Schumann).
58 Some examples of Europe attempting to imitate Chinese porcelain technologies can be
found in RENÉ ÉTIEMBLE, L’EUROPE CHINOISE 523 (2000).
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be addressed in one article. It is widely believed that Mao’s prosecution
of intellectuals was an immediate cause of the loss. However, in my
view, this was not the origin.59 Back to the seventeenth century, Chinese
innovative capacity was already declining. If we accept Joseph
Needham’s findings on the level of China’s science and technology,60
then China’s innovative accomplishment was already at its peak before
the seventeenth century, making it fairly impossible to further break
through without the guide of modern science. This difficulty was further
deteriorated under the Manchu Qing ruling, during which the nomadic
emperors viewed Han-Chinese-occupied technologies as a threat to their
conquest and exercised harsh policies to confine Chinese intellectuals in
the self-entertaining closets of archaeology and philology.61 As a result,
under the Qing, creativity and innovation sharply declined.62
Readers of this Article should not mechanically view the above
time travel as a nationalistic expression. It is not a fantasy either. Only
by understanding the firm roots of respecting creativity and innovation
in the Chinese cultural DNA, as supported by so much of Chinese
history, can we fully realize that China’s innovation dream today is
ultimately an effort of reconnecting itself to its disconnected past.63 This
understanding is further confirmed if we accept, as Alford rightly
pointed out—with no misleading point to creativity—that “the power of
past” is overwhelming in Chinese thinking.64 When discussing IP issues
in China, our conventional focus on China’s post-Opium War
xenophobia is inevitably too narrow and, again, disconnected.
Xenophobia is not really the focus for the Chinese; bouncing back from
the downside is. Although not all Chinese people feel the chemistry of
reconnection, it is exactly what is happening, in what we call the painful
transition of contemporary China.65
Reconnecting China to its high-end tradition is both an “is” and a
59
60

For a discussion, see Shao, History is a Key Decoder, supra note 2.
Joseph Needham has written extensively on this matter. Even modern science which
appears to have three exclusive Western origins was made possible by a vital component of
magnetic phenomena, the foundations of which had all been laid by China. 7-2 JOSEPH NEEDHAM,
SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN CHINA: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 24
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004).
61 THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA 196 (Gilbert Rozman ed., 1982).
62 MARK ELVIN, THE PATTERN OF THE CHINESE PAST A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION 193–94 (1973).
63 This view is expressed publicly in a business article. See Shao, True China Knowledge,
supra note 25, at 16.
64 See ALFORD, supra note 42, at 19–29.
65 The Chinese government calls for the revival of Chinese civilization. It does depict the
trend, if we are not too frightened by the political flavors. A very interesting research released in
August 2012 even claims that the task of the revival of Chinese civilization has completed 62%.
See, e.g., Sun Zifa, Experts Claims That the Task of the Revival of Chinese Civilization Had
(Aug.
3,
2012,
11:51
PM),
Completed
62%
by
2010,
CHINA NEWS
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/08-03/4082518.shtml.
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“should-be” agenda. In contemporary China’s complex transition,
tender memories of China’s civilized, peaceful past, such as the Tang
and Song dynasties where humanity, institutions, law, literary creativity,
and technologies were highly developed, can act as positive catalyst
agents in contemporary Chinese mind—reminding them that there is
much to achieve in addition to new money. In contrast, Cassandras, by
constantly reminding the Chinese with yellow peril, techno-nationalism,
or copycats, might talk down an otherwise fairly healthy situation,
especially when our world is full of so many uncertainties at the
moment.
III. DON’T FORGET THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Now let us proceed to another aspect of the holistic perspective—
the international context under which the global “development” of the
IP system has been unreasonably expanding. 66 For many renowned
Western scholars specializing in IP law, this topic is nothing new,
although it might not have been specifically linked to China. But for
many others, the notion that the global IP system is unreasonably
expanding is either an ignored agenda or hard to accept.
At the top of what I call the “global value chain of knowledge,”
there are developed countries which possess various advantages gained
during the stages of their industrialization and colonization.67 Since the
decline of colonization in the second half of the twentieth century, the
enclosure of knowledge worldwide has transformed those developed
countries’ global dominance into a new area. By the exclusive force of
IP protection, production activities and profits can be concentrated
among only the big players.68 When it comes to international relations
and global trade, powerful states control the brain of the world and thus
make much higher profits than the cheap-labor suppliers.
The global value chain of knowledge has largely been made
possible through IP standard-setting. Powerful companies in Western
countries heavily lobby their governments to create internationally
“high” standards of IP laws that coincidentally favor their own
commercial interest.69 The term “high” is correct in the sense that many
66 For a succinct discussion, see Ken Shao, Monopoly or Reward?—The Origin of Copyright
and Authorship in England, France and China and a New Criticism of Intellectual Property, 41
HONG KONG L.J. 731, 733–35 (2011).
67 See Shao, The Global Debates on Intellectual Property: What if China Is Not a Born
Pirate?, supra note 29, at 344. For similar views on this, see Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey &
Timothy Sturgeon, The Governance of Global Value Chains, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 78, 87
(2005) (mentioning that the value chain’s hierarchy requires those on the top to control resources,
especially intellectual property, in order to stay on top).
68 Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 394 (1999).
69 For how the global IP system was mapped by the commercial interest of those companies,
see SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
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standards are tougher than what is needed in developing countries. It is,
however, very misleading in the sense that by nature some standards do
not function as high-level pro-innovation catalysts, but rather as highlevel protectionist shells for multinationals. For instance, some
recognized IP standards do not prohibit cheap-quality patents from
being approved for government protection, leading one to conclude that
these patentability standards are really not all that “high.”70
As a result, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that governs global IP standardsetting has excreted many uncertainties to developing countries in
various sectors, including public health, agriculture, education, and
market competition. 71 In sharp contrast, developing countries have
never exercised a meaningful sovereignty over global IP standardsetting to suit their development needs.72 China, as well as many other
developing countries, hobble in this fog.
Another tactic causes more concern, yet only recently was
captured. In an unprecedented work, Peter Drahos surveyed forty-five
countries to investigate the networked governance of patent offices
around the world. 73 Drahos’ study revealed that many developed
countries’ patent offices have become the private servants to the
commercial interest of multinationals, which use patent offices as a
shortcut to expand their non-transparent patent portfolios. 74 Patent
searches are a necessary step before granting a patent to an invention,
yet performing such searches can be difficult for developing countries,
which often lack the resources of developed countries’ patent offices.
As a result, many patents are granted in developing countries through
developed-country-maneuvered, internationally-networked systems—
such as the PCT channel—which functions like automatic transmission
belts and do not have effective monitoring mechanisms for minimizing
the impact of “high-standard” patents to the domestic development
agendas of developing countries.75The above international contexts set a
broad framework. And this context needs to be holistically considered
when assessing the necessities of China’s self-driven innovation. Here,
a few examples give light to the issue and further establish why a
holistic approach is needed.
PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM:
WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002).
70 For a discussion of the cheap-quality patent standards, see DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 14.
71 Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime,
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 365 (2004).
72 Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property StandardSetting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 766–67 (2002).
73 DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 14.
74 Id. at 4.
75 Id. at 334.
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Renewable energy receives strong policy support in China.76 The
growth potential of renewable energy, however, is linked to the global
patent system. A short investigation commissioned by the International
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) in 2007
concluded that with respect to photovoltaics (PV), biofuel, and wind
energy, “there seem unlikely to be significant IP barriers to developing
nation access.”77 This claim might have been a little bit over-optimistic,
especially if we do not limit the definition of “access” to licensing and
technology purchase. A substantial analysis conducted by the Research
and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) in 2009
warned developing countries of the potential patent barriers, in
particular in biofuel and wind energy sectors. 78 Further, an OECD
survey in 2008 showed that Brazil, India, China, and Russia collectively
only own about six percent of renewable energy patents, while the EU,
the U.S., and Japan own almost eighty percent.79
Even though core technologies in the PV industry appear to be
available in the public domain, 80 developing countries generally have
little access to the cutting-edge renewable technologies available in
developed countries. For developing countries like China and India,
domestic innovation capacity-building is more important than simply
receiving technology diffusion through cross-border, Darwinist,
commercial transactions of technologies. They require more flexibility
that is largely unavailable under the TRIPS regime and international
political frameworks.81 An orthodox definition of “access” therefore can
be quite meaningless.
China suffers an overproduction problem of solar panels, meaning
more panels are produced than can be consumed. But a worse issue is
the lack of core technology and patent ownership in the relevant fields.

76 For a new study on renewable energy that addresses the energy policies in China and the
West, see ZHONGXIANG ZHANG, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA: TOWARDS A
LOW-CARBON ECONOMY (2011).
77 John H. Barton, Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in
Developing Countries: An Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind Technologies,
ICTSD TRADE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY SERIES, ISSUE PAPER NO. 2, at 1, 18 (2007).
78 K. Ravi Srinivas, Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights,
RIS DISCUSSION PAPERS, RIS-DP NO. 153, 1 (2009).
79 OECD, COMPENDIUM OF PATENT STATISTICS 21 (2008). A survey in 2007 also confirmed
a similar situation. See Zhou Fang, Patents in Chinese Solar Cells and Solutions, 5 ELECS.
INTELL. PROP. 52, 52–56 (2007).
80 Arnaud de la Tour, Matthieu Glachant & Yann Ménière, Innovation and International
Technology Transfer: The Case of the Chinese Photovoltaic Industry, 39 ENERGY POLICY 761,
768 (2011).
81 David G. Ockwell, Ruediger Haum, Alexandra Mallett & Jim Watson, Intellectual
Property Rights and Low Carbon Technology Transfer: Conflicting Discourses of Diffusion and
Development, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 729, 734–36 (2010). This excellent paper
distinguishes licensing and transfer from domestic innovation capacity-building and development
needs of developing countries. Id.
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Thus, Chinese solar giants such as Suntech and LDK have to purchase
silicon products or production equipment from developed countries at
high prices.82 Western suppliers sell outdated technologies to China and
use that revenue for further R&D in cutting-edge technologies. 83 By
comparison, China’s patent portfolios in solar equipment technologies
are quite weak. Further, an impressive number of Chinese patent
applications in the field of solar equipment production predominately
concentrate on utility model patents. This situation creates two dead
ends: as Peng Xiaofeng, the Chairman of LDK said, overproduction
deteriorates on the low end whilst core technologies are lacking at the
high end.84
To put the PV example into a real commercial context, the dead
end situation means that although China’s PV industry occupies 50% of
the world market, it mainly specializes in PV module manufacturing,
earning only 8–10% in the global PV value chain. 85 Patents are
becoming the Achilles heel of China’s solar industry and many believe
that self-driven innovation is the solution under the current challenging
global environment.
The Chinese government has recognized the struggles of its
industry, and at various international climate summits, China has
promoted IP flexibilities—such as the use of patent pools, public sector
licensing, compulsory licensing, and patent exclusions. In response, the
U.S. industry and trade representatives have insisted on strong IP
protection in the field of clean technologies.86 The U.S. government has
also tried to block the sale of solar patents from U.S. companies to
Chinese purchasers. 87 This situation was followed by multinationals’
rigorous patent patrol in China.88 The battles are indeed fierce, but they
also beg the question of whether patent and licensing should be rigidly
enforced in areas that mean so much to climate change and pollution
treatment. In a recent study of the matter, Peter Drahos proposed that it
is necessary to deal with this urgent issue at the highest level of cooperation and via a variety of governance tools that move beyond the
82 Lu Xiaohui, The Lack of Core Technologies in China’s PV Industry and its Challenges,
CHINA HIGH-TECH INDUS. HERALD, May 10, 2010.
83 Id.
84 Xiao Xiao, PV Industry: Increasing Innovation to Change the Future, SIPO NEWS, June 1,
2012.
85 Liu Chengkun, The China-Europe Hidden War in PV Industries, TIME WEEKLY, Aug. 9,
2012.
86 Matthew Rimmer, Who Owns the Sun? Patent Law and Clean Energy, THE
CONVERSATION (Feb. 21, 2012, 2:50 PM), http://theconversation.edu.au/who-owns-the-sunpatent-law-and-clean-energy-5193.
87 Id.
88 See, e.g., Ellen Pressley, DuPont Addresses Patent Protection at Solarbuzz China:
Intellectual Property Theft Growing in Competitive Climate of Photovoltaics, DUPONT NEWS &
EVENTS
(July
19,
2012),
http://www2.dupont.com/Photovoltaics/en_US/news_events/article20120719.html.
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“ghost” of ideological debates over IP. 89 China has already initiated
Drahos’s proposal—by developing self-driven innovation policies that
will be discussed in Part IV of this paper.
IP is not the only marsh for Chinese high-tech firms. There are
many other connected ones in the WTO’s trading territory. The Chinese
PV industry has recently attracted protectionist actions amid the
economic downturn in the U.S. and Europe. From November 2011 to
May 2012, the U.S. government announced several actions against a
number of large Chinese solar firms under the WTO mechanisms of
antidumping, subsidies, and countervailing.90 This has now been spread
to Germany.91
The solar industry is only one example of the challenge of the
global IP regime, and there are many more. Innovation in China’s statesupported automobile industry, for instance, is substantially outweighed
by purchase of foreign models and technologies.92 Foreign investment
and limited technology spillover have not helped the Chinese
manufacturers to undertake desired R&D activities. In the new-energy
car sector—a field where all countries once stood at the same relative
starting point in the race—the lack of core technologies and strong
patent portfolios are dramatically affecting China’s R&D and industrial
capacities and ability to become an innovative leader in this new
market. 93 This situation has eased the U.S. concerns over Chinese
competition, as American companies “appear to have continued to
expand production of vehicles in China.”94
The international context set forth thus far facilitates a holistic
understanding of a purpose for China’s self-driven innovation initiative,
namely, to gain more development flexibilities. China has received
much criticism for its attempts to set native technical standards to
achieve its goal, but China is neither the first nor the last country to seek
use of technical standards to enhance competitiveness. 95 In an
89 Peter Drahos, The China-US Relationship on Climate Change, Intellectual Property and
CCS: Requiem for a Species?, 2009 WIPO J. 125, 126.
90 For details, view the press releases published on the U.S. Department of Commerce
website, News Room, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., www.commerce.gov/news (last visited Apr. 1, 2013);
e.g., Int’l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Fact Sheet, Commerce Preliminarily Finds
Dumping of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules from
the
People’s
Republic
of
China
(May
17,
2012),
available
at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prc-solar-cells-ad-prelim-20120517.pdf.
91 Chengkun, supra note 85.
92 G. E. ANDERSON, DESIGNATED DRIVERS: HOW CHINA PLANS TO DOMINATE THE GLOBAL
AUTO INDUSTRY 39 (2012).
93 Liu Siyang, Three Development Models of China’s New-Energy Automobiles, SERI CHINA,
July 20, 2012.
94 ITC 2011 REPORT, supra note 11, at 5-5–5-33.
95 Richard P. Suttmeier and Yao Xiangkui, China’s Post-WTO Technology Policy: Standards,
Software, and the Changing Nature of Techno-Nationalism, 7 NAT’L BUREAU ASIAN RES.,
SPECIAL REP. 7, 45 (2004).
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international environment where IP barriers are strong, establishing new
technical standards might be a dark horse for Chinese companies to
smash through those barriers. China’s automobile industry is often
criticized by foreign commentators for “copy design” and patent
infringement.96 But a relaxed IP law system is a valuable way to enable
accumulation of knowledge. In fact, this now-criticized approach was
used by all major countries at their own developing stages in the past.97
Yet, today, similar flexibilities are not available to developing countries
under the highly harmonized international IP regime and WTO
system.98 This change might arguably explain the context for some of
China’s “avant-garde” solutions to self-driven innovation, such as
government procurement and preferential lending.
It is noteworthy that China’s self-driven innovation is not
monolithic or insensitive to non-Chinese interests.99 According to the
U.S. government, this shift in China’s policy focus only occurred in
2010–11.100 However, China’s leaders went to great lengths to remind
the international community that self-driven innovation policies are not
designed to insulate China from international cooperation. 101 For
example, multinational pharmaceutical companies have already been
one of the beneficiaries of China’s innovation policy incentives. Under
China’s $960 million “New Drug Creation and Development Program
(2008),” recipients included domestic drug R&D institutions, as well as
dozens of giant multinationals such as Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and
Roche. 102 Evidence shows that these multinationals are innovating in
China and may share patent ownership with Chinese developers.103

96
97

ANDERSON, supra note 92, at 39.
For instance, to understand the relaxed experiences of the U.S., Germany, and the
Netherland, see MEREDITH L. MCGILL, AMERICAN LITERATURE AND THE CULTURE OF
REPRINTING (2003) (providing a case study of the American publishing industry in the 1830s and
1840s, which heavily engaged in reprinting of foreign books, and arguing that the sale of cheap
reprints of foreign books during this era is what established the mass-market demand for literature
in America); ECKHARD HÖFFNER, GESCHICHTE UND WESEN DES URHEBERRECHTS [HISTORY
AND NATURE OF COPYRIGHT] (2010) (discussing the German experience); G. Doorman, Patent
Law in the Netherlands–Suspended in 1869 and Reestablished in 1910, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
225 (1948) (discussing the patent system in the Nethlands in the nineteenth century and the
history of its temporary abolition).
98 For an examination of the potential inconsistencies between China’s innovation policies
and its WTO obligations, see Siyuan An & Brian Peck, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policy in
the Context of its WTO Obligations and Commitments, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 375 (2011).
99 Richard P. Suttmeier, A New Technonationalism?: China and the Development of
Technical Standards, 48 COMMC’NS. OF THE ACM 35, 37 (2005).
100 ITC 2011 REPORT, supra note 11, at 5-5–5-6.
101 Cong Cao, Richard P. Suttmeier & Denis Fred Simon, China’s 15-Year Science and
Technology Plan, PHYSICS TODAY, Dec. 2006, at 38, 43.
102 Bethan Hughes, China Spurs Pharma Innovation, 9 NATURE REVS. 581, 581 (2010).
103 Id. at 581–82.
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IV. LET’S FACE THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT
The third holistic perspective is the development context. Selfdriven innovation that reconnects China to its high-end cultural DNA
and responds to the global value chain of knowledge ultimately serves
China’s development needs and attends to China’s specific conditions in
both global and local contexts. It is a guiding principle of the
international community that every country deserves opportunities of
development. “Development for All” is a United Nation agenda that
includes an emphasis on higher standards of living and social progress
for all nations.104
In the absence of any specific WTO/TRIPS clauses that facilitate
development-friendly IP policies in developing countries, a selfdetermined “Development Impact Assessment” (DIA) framework, as
Graham Dutfield has proposed, is essential to the development needs of
developing countries. 105 China’s pro-self-innovation efforts can be
viewed as a good example of a DIA framework, which includes multilayered, interconnected, and flexible policies, incentives, and strategies.
This system, initially defined as the national innovation system (NIS) by
Christopher Freeman,106 has been developed through different stages in
tune with different economic changes in post-Cultural Revolution
China.107
China’s most relevant and comprehensive NIS policies include, for
instance, the National Medium and Long-Term Guideline for Science
and Technology Development Plan 2006-2020 (the S&T Guideline), the
National Guideline of Intellectual Property Strategy 2008 (the IP
Strategy), the National Medium and Long-term Guideline of Talent
Development Plan 2010-2020 (the Talent Plan), the Cultural Reform
and Development Outlines in the 12th Five-Year Plan Period 2012 (the
Cultural Renaissance Plan), and the Energy-saving and New-energy
Automobiles Development Plan 2012–2020 (The New-energy
Automobiles Plan). 108 These forward-looking national-level strategies
sufficiently reflect state sovereignty and autonomy in designing
domestic development frameworks.
These multi-layered, interconnected, and flexible NIS policy
frameworks may help China to address its numerous challenges that are
104 UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, THE UNITED NATIONS
DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA:
DEVELOPMENT
FOR
ALL
(2007),
available
at
http://www.un.org/esa/devagenda/UNDA_BW5_Final.pdf.
105 Graham Dutfield, Making TRIPS Work for Developing Countries, in DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: POLICY APPROACHES, 141, 163–65 (Gary P. Sampson & W.
Bradnee Chambers eds., 2008).
106 CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN, TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1987).
107 For a discussion of many of these policies, see Shao, Patent Law, National Strategies and
Policy Incentives, supra note 2, at 86–87.
108 Id. at 94–99.
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the results of internal and external factors. These factors include a laborintensive economy, severe pollution, wealth gap, institutional
dysfunctions, low knowledge and skill levels, and weak technological
and cultural strengths in the global context, to name a few—all of which
require immediate attention. Innovation is a vital solution to these
problems, but within this solution there are financial, structural, and
human resource challenges to be further addressed.109
Human resource represents a key solution to innovation. But
human resource is a fundamental problem for China. In my view, the
biggest challenge for China’s overall transition is the quality of Chinese
human resource, which limits the capacity of China’s political, legal,
economic, and educational reforms. This can be confirmed from a
conclusion of the 2012 China Business Climate Survey Report of U.S.
AmCham China:
finding qualified talent—both at the managerial level and below—is
a major concern . . . This year AmCham China members ranked
management-level human resources constraints as their top business
challenge.110

Many view institutions as the fundamental obstacle to China’s
development of a knowledge-based economy, a civilized society, social
order, and rule of law and thus cannot wait for the changes. This focus
on institutions ignores the crucial fact that China’s human resource
foundation was ruined in the Cultural Revolution and cannot now
support high-level institutional changes. When Deng Xiaoping reopened China’s door in 1978, China was at the edge of collapse with an
exploded and uneducated population. The only choice for China in the
well-established global value chain at the time was to supply cheap
labor from its uneducated and unskilled population.111
But cheap labor was not the end for Deng who firmly believed that
“science and technology are the primary productive force.” 112 Yet,
human resource problems are omnipresent in China and the innovation
109 In an economic work, these issues were addressed. See CARL J. DAHLMAN & JEAN-ERIC
AUBERT, CHINA AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: SEIZING THE 21ST CENTURY (2001).
110 The survey shows a 43% unsatisfaction rate of management-level human resource
constraints. See THE AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
CHINA
BUSINESS
CLIMATE
SURVEY
11
(2012),
available
at
http://web.resource.amchamchina.org/cmsfile/2012/03/26/c46fc22667c5eeb231748808a9244027.
pdf. This was rated at 30% in 2011. See THE AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, CHINA BUSINESS CLIMATE SURVEY 11 (2011), available at
http://www.amchamchina.org/upload/cmsfile/2011/03/22/efb2ab9d3806269fc343f640cb33baf9.p
df.
111 Shao, Patent Law, National Strategies and Policy Incentives, supra note 2, at 86–87.
112 Deng Xiaoping, 3 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING 274 (1993); Philip Shenon,
Chinese Accused of Pirating Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1994, at D1 (noting that this Deng
Xiaoping quote appeared on a billboard in China).
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sectors are certainly inescapable. In some areas, such as the PV
industry, policy implementations are designed by inexperience policymakers and often lack clear definitions, consistency, and
accessibility.113 Chinese investors, often unskilled in the many areas in
which they invest, rush into the solar market and focus on the initial
stages of investment, but struggle with quality and cost management.114
In the new-energy car sector, policy uncertainties separated business
resources and resulted in the launch of the New-energy Automobiles
Plan that specifically focuses on alternative fuels and hybrid batteries.115
In response to the human resource problems, for over thirty years,
through research funding and open-door policies, China has been
supporting and encouraging native Chinese to study overseas. Together
with the human resources accumulated internally, this has created a vast
talent pool for China. Central and local governments, as well as
different innovation parks, companies, and institutions now have
numerous dynamic talent programs to attract Chinese talents to
contribute to China’s innovation economy.116
In today’s China, policy adjustments are not simply statecontrolled. 117 Elites are increasingly involved in China’s decisionmaking processes, such as through direct politic engagement, public
hearings, research studies, and fieldworks. 118 Here innovation parks,
industrial parks, and economic zones may play a constructive role:
scientists, managers, and researchers are clustered there, providing firsthand experience to policy changes.119 Boosting the energy of Chinese
talents is a fundamental solution to China’s development needs in all
sectors.
But attracting overseas Chinese human resources requires flexible
policies, such as preferential lending and subsidies. In China, obtaining

113 Yu Hongbo, Shi Zhengrong: The PV Industry as Part of China’s Energy Strategy, PV
News, July 24, 2012.
114 Id.
115 Liu, supra note 93.
116 Shao, Patent Law, National Strategies and Policy Incentives, supra note 2, at 96–97.
117 For a perhaps slightly overstrained analysis of the governmental role in China’s innovation,
see Feng-chao Liu, Denis Fred Simon, Yu-tao Sun & Cong Cao, China’s Innovation Policies:
Evolution, Institutional Structure, and Trajectory, 40 RES. POLICY 917 (2011). Economic studies
show that private firms lead innovation in China. For an excellent economic study, see Xielin Liu
& Peng Cheng, Is China’s Indigenous Innovation Strategy Compatible with Globalization?, 61
CENTER
POLICY
STUDIES
33–37
(2011),
available
at
EAST-WEST
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/ps061.pdf.
118 For a description of part of this system, see Cong Cao, Towards a Better Understanding of
China’s Scientific Elite, in GREATER CHINA’S QUEST FOR INNOVATION 217, 223–25 (Henry S.
Rowen, Marguerite Gong Hancock & William F. Miller eds., 2008).
119 In 2010, I analyzed the innovation capacity and policy implementation functions of these
industrial districts in China. See Shao, Patent Law, National Strategies and Policy Incentives,
supra note 2, at 99–102 This has since been substantially studied by Michael Keane. See KEANE,
CHINA’S NEW CREATIVE CLUSTERS, supra note 9.
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a bank loan is extremely difficult for small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), which suffer huge problems of cash flow. As a 2011 survey
conducted by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
shows, only 15% of Chinese light industrial SMEs accessed bank loan
in 2011. 120 Under China’s current conditions, establishing a credit
system for SMEs can be a challenge. Venture capital may be an
alternative solution, as has been common and successful in some
leading innovation economies such as the U.S. and Israel.121 A typical
example is that a local government in an innovation park may set up
such a venture capital fund, which is then managed by a government
agency or a private company. Private fund and university and foreign
investment also play certain roles. 122 However, inexperienced human
resource is again the biggest problem: the lack of qualified fund
managers, for instance, has been identified by various studies as a
bottleneck in China’s venture capital sector.123
In this context, preferential lending might be an effective solution
for high-tech companies and forms a crucial part of the talent programs
for attracting overseas Chinese returnees. These returnees that studied
abroad would otherwise not return home if cash flow within China is a
big problem for commercializing their high-tech dreams, which often
start from small seeds of investment. The same applies to public
procurement, which, as OECD researches show, is increasingly
becoming a powerful instrument to drive innovation in many countries
due to its potential of reducing market risk. South Korea is a good and
successful example. 124 Given China’s current status quo, public
procurement can be an effective way to support firms, such as those
established by Chinese returnees.
The implementations of China’s IP strategies also reflect the needs
of self-determined policy framework. In 2010, Tian Lipu, Director of
the State Intellectual Property Office, published an article for the second
anniversary of the establishment of the IP Strategy.125 Tian began his
article by discussing the fundamental importance of using the IP
120 Liu Shiping, Solving the Loan Difficulties for SMEs: How Long Will We Wait?, XINHUA
NEWS, Apr. 23, 2012.
121 For an explanation of the Israeli system copied in China, see CHUNLIN ZHANG, DOUGLAS
ZHIHUA ZENG, WILLIAM PETER MAKO & JAMES SEWARD, PROMOTING ENTERPRISE-LED
INNOVATION
IN
CHINA
92
(2009),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CHINAEXTN/Resources/3189491242182077395/peic_full_report.pdf.
122 JOHN L. ORCUTT & HONG SHEN, SHAPING CHINA’S INNOVATION FUTURE: UNIVERSITY
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TRANSITION 197 (2010).
123 ZHANG, supra note 121, at 201–03.
124 OECD, REVIEWS OF INNOVATION POLICY: KOREA 244 (2009), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264067233-en.
125 Tian Lipu, Providing Effective Support to Fastening the Change of Economic Development
Model, STATE INTELL. PROP. OFFICE OF CHINA (June 4, 2010, 5:56 PM),
www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=9544.
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Strategy to boost the internal momentum and core competitiveness for
China’s development. 126 He also explicitly criticized China’s labor
intensive model for its low innovative capacity and damage to the
environment.127 It is essential, as being proposed by many Western IP
scholars, that developing countries have their own IP strategies suitable
for domestic development.
China is increasingly becoming strategic on patent matters. It has
established strict patentability criteria and universal prior art pools in
specific technological areas such as agriculture. These models are
inspired by German and EU laws, which interpret patentability more
strictly than the U.S.128 China is not alone. Brazil has a quite powerful
monitoring system on pharmaceutical patents. Singapore, which is a
small player in the global patent system, has amended its Patent Act in
2012 to include a better domestic capacity-building mechanism for
reducing reliance on foreign patent examinations. 129 Flexibilities and
autonomy need to be enjoyed by China’s IP strategies for satisfying
domestic agendas; they need to be de-ideologized.
The last example to be contextualized in this Article is China’s
emerging cultural creative industries (wenhua chuangyi chanye). This
topic had traditionally “escaped mainstream academic attention” in the
West.130 When discussing China’s cultural industries, censorship might
be the first keyword that comes into many commentators’ minds. This,
however, should not be taken to deny the progress and necessity of
China’s cultural industry. A UNCTAD’s report shows that creative
goods exports have enabled China to gain the highest trade surplus,
which increased from $29 billion in 2002 to $79 billion in 2008.131 This
shows some progress, but creative designing capacity in China is still
overall weak. Although China has produced an increasing amount of
top-end cultural products, such as movies, exports of Chinese cultural
goods are largely limited to low-end handicrafts for low-end foreign
markets.
To address this issue, China recently announced its Cultural
126
127
128
129

Id.
Id.
DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 14, at 232.
Duan Ran, Singapore Plans to Reform Patent Law to Improve Examination Capacity,
INTELL.
PROP.
OFFICE
OF
CHINA
(June
15,
2012),
STATE
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dtxx/gw/2012/201206/t20120615_709500.html.
130 Michael Keane, Great Adaptations: China’s Creative Clusters and the New Social
Contract, 23 CONTINUUM: J. OF MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD. 229 (2009). But since 2011, a few
excellent monographs have been produced in English, focusing on issues such as creative
capacity, industrial scales, and intellectual property issues. For three excellent books, see PANG,
supra note 5; KEANE, CHINA’S NEW CREATIVE CLUSTERS, supra note 9; LI WUWEI, HOW
CREATIVITY IS CHANGING CHINA (Michael Keane ed., 2011).
131 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, CREATIVE ECONOMY
REPORT 2010, 133–34 (2010), available at http://unctad.org/es/Docs/ditctab20103_en.pdf.
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Renaissance Plan,132 which has a purpose of increasing China’s “soft
power of culture.”133 This jargon does not have to scare international
communities. Whilst copyright piracy in the short term affects foreign
revenues, it also stimulates creative ideas and maximizes affordable
access to cultural products by low- and middle-income populations
within Mainland China. An interesting consequence is that piracy helps
the prevalence of foreign culture, if not foreign copyright, in the nation.
Cultural products are about styles, tastes, and perceptions. For this
reason, piracy acts as an affordable, powerful agent to, as Laikwan Pang
has accurately discovered, develop a “reception structure” in which
domestic consumers admire foreign culture.134 Yet this consumption of
foreign culture can also lead to the decline of domestic creativity and
cultural identities. Thus effective cultural policies, such as China’s
Cultural Renaissance Plan, are crucial to all nations to preserve
domestic culture.
Boosting cultural and creative industries has great meaning for China.
Arguably, China’s fundamental development need in education, a
civilized society, and rule of law essentially require a Chinese Cultural
Renaissance which, as the first section of this Article articulates,
reconnects Chinese people to their high-end cultural DNA and past and
thus inspires a peaceful and constructive transitional period. The
splendid success of the Western civilization was grounded in the
European Renaissance. In China, this cultural renaissance process has
been interrupted by internal and external facts in China’s modern
history.135 Boosting cultural and creative industries can dramatically
change this unfortunate part of Chinese history and lift China’s cultural
strengths and images from the extremely low-end to its deserved highend. As we have discussed previously, misunderstandings of China are
ultimately caused not by foreign nescience, racism, or Eurocentrism, but
by the abundance of low-end and distorted Chinese culture that flows in
China and abroad. The best way to remedy the misconceptions and to
ensure desirable development outcomes for both China and the world is
by promoting, embracing, and exporting high-end Chinese culture and
thus increasing the so-called soft power of culture.
CONCLUSION
Due to the complexities of internal and external causes, a holistic

132 State Council Issued its National “12th Five-year Plan on Cultural Reform and
Development”, CHINA NEWS (Feb. 15, 2012, 6:29 PM), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/201202/15/content_2067781.htm.
133 Id.
134 PANG, supra note 5, at 172. Pang also analyzed the extreme popularity of the Japanese
Miyazaki collection in China. Id. at 161–83.
135 See supra notes 31–36, 57–61 and accompanying text.
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perspective of China is, in general, lacking. Self-driven innovation in
China provides an ideal example of how a non-holistic perspective
distorts the nature of historical events and policies in China. Foreign
concerns over China’s self-driven innovation policies and incentives
should be re-assessed by considering the holistic perspectives proposed
in this Article. To make such a shift work, de-ideologization should to
be the first step, followed by the willingness to accept new facts.
China’s self-driven innovation policy initiative is a response to
internal and external challenges faced by the nation’s own development
needs. The imbalanced international order pushes China to opt for selfdetermined, flexible innovation approaches, which are not available
within the rigid and development-unfriendly WTO/TRIPS regime.
Internal challenges such as a labor-intensive model, severe pollution,
wealth gaps, and serious human resource problems all require China to
have flexible development opportunities in innovation and further
economic transition. Notably, flexible development opportunities were
available to the now-industrialized nations during their earlier stages of
development and helped them to become established as developed
countries.
Innovation can and should be a key bridge to a peaceful and
successful transition in modern China. A proper examination of Chinese
history reveals the fact that innovation is in the Chinese cultural DNA
and China used to be a global innovation leader in pre-industrial eras.
Reconnecting China to its high-end tradition and past is fundamentally
beneficial to its progress in the future. Tender memories of China’s
civilized, peaceful past, such as the Tang and Song dynasties, where
humanity, institutions, law, literary creativity, and technologies were
highly developed, can act as positive catalyst agents in the Chinese
mind—reminding them that there is much to achieve in addition to new
money.
There is “little that the international community can do to change”
China’s innovation pace. 136 U.S. government policy advisers have
already realized that China and the U.S. should promote innovation
jointly; 137 they increasingly believe that the two nations “share an
interest in seeing China emerge as a prosperous technological
innovator.”138 Collaboration benefits all. The worst strategy is one that
talks down China’s innovation, misdirecting the Chinese to embrace a
136
137

Statement of Richard P. Suttmeier, supra note 13, at 41.
CHARLES W. WESSNER, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., BUILDING THE 21ST
CENTURY: U.S.-CHINA COOPERATION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INNOVATION 4–5
(2011).
138 China’s Indigenous Innovation Trade and Investment Policies: How Great a Threat?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the H. Comm. On
Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 53 (2011) (statement of Philip I. Levy, Resident Scholar, The Am.
Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Res.).
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narrow and dangerous version of nationalism.
When we look back, China’s unfortunate fate in the last few
centuries is merely an episode within a different and much larger story.
A student who wants to recover from his devastating downside
inevitably brings up pain, instability, and emotions. But his peers do not
need to be too nervous. Teamwork is an eternal spirit for a classroom,
and so it is—and can be—for the world.

